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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law alleging that the
City of Wilmington, Delaware, and Wilmington Police Detective Michael R. Lawson, Jr.,
(collectively, “Defendants”) violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
committed state law false imprisonment and battery, when Lawson and an armed SWAT
team of the Wilmington Police Department executed an allegedly invalid search warrant
by entering the home of Plaintiffs DeWayne Walker, Sr., his wife, Karen Walker, their
teenaged son, DeWayne Walker, Jr., and their two-year-old daughter (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”), seizing Plaintiffs, and searching the premises.  The warrant authorized the
search for and seizure of evidence relating to a recent homicide that the police believed
had been committed by Dwayne A. Walker, whose date of birth was 12/10/82.  As
Defendants now acknowledge, Dwayne A. Walker is unrelated to Plaintiffs and has never
been to their home at 118 Dutton Drive, New Castle, Delaware.
3The District Court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on all of
Plaintiffs’ federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their
state claims.  Because we write only for the parties, we will presume knowledge of the
record.  We will affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
On September 13, 2005, a man named DeWayne Freeman was stabbed to death
during a drug-related dispute in Wilmington.  Based on statements from witnesses at the
scene, the police suspected that Dwayne A. Walker was the killer, and on that day,
Lawson applied for an arrest warrant for Dwayne A. Walker.
Lawson was the chief investigator of the Freeman homicide, and as such, he
retrieved Dwayne A. Walker’s criminal record from the Delaware Criminal Justice
Information System (“DELJIS”).  This record showed an address of 703 West Fifth Street
in Wilmington, but when a police officer went to that address, the occupant stated that
Dwayne A. Walker did not live there.
On September 14, 2005, a confidential informant who had observed the murder
contacted Detective Jeff Silvers, one of Lawson’s colleagues.  This informant had
assisted Silvers with more than twenty criminal investigations over the preceding five-
year period and had proved reliable.  The informant told Silvers that Dwayne A. Walker
The informant’s sister-in-law is the mother of two of Dwayne A. Walker’s1
children.
According to the testimony of Plaintiff Karen Walker, Wilton is a housing2
development in New Castle, Delaware.  Plaintiffs’ home is not in the Wilton development
but is instead about one half-mile from the development.
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was staying with the informant’s sister-in-law,  and later that day, the informant brought1
Silvers to the sister-in-law’s house to show him where it was.  When the police returned
to arrest Dwayne A. Walker, he could not be found.
The informant contacted Silvers again later the same day to advise him that
Dwayne A. Walker’s “mother lived in Wilton, and if he wasn’t at [the] sister-in-law’s
house, that’s probably [the] most likely place he could be found,” because “the first thing
[Dwayne A. Walker] would do was run to his mom, which he always done whenever he
got in trouble.”  App. at A277-78, A292.  The informant did not purport to have been in
contact with Dwayne A. Walker.  He did not know if Dwayne A. Walker had any kind of
plan at the time, and he did not know if Dwayne A. Walker in fact went to his mother’s
house.  The informant did not know the address of the mother’s house, aside from the fact
that it was in the Wilton area of New Castle and that she had moved there recently,  but2
he informed Silvers that her boyfriend and daughter (Dwayne A. Walker’s sister) might
be living with her.  Silvers immediately told Lawson what the informant had told him. 
Lawson remembers that the informant told “Silvers that he wasn’t sure of the mom’s
name or the mom’s name may have been different from” Dwayne A. Walker’s last name. 
Id. at A216.
5Regarding what kind of car Dwayne A. Walker’s mother drove at the time, the
informant gave the following testimony at his deposition:
Q. What kind [of automobile did the mother have]?
A. At that time she had a Maxima.
Q. A Maxima?
A. Yes.  Nissan Maxima, maroon.
Id. at A281.  A short while later, the questioning regarding the car continued:
Q. So did you tell Detective Silvers that Dwayne Walker’s
mother drove a Lexus?
A. Did I tell him she drove a Lexus?
Q. Yeah.
A. No.
Q. And she didn’t did she?
A. No.  She drove a Maxima at that time.
Q. Was there a Lexus?  Did you provide him with
information that you thought there might be a Lexus at
that house?
A. No.  Not that I know of.
Q. Did Detective Silvers ask you whether you knew what
kind of cars may have been in the driveway or parked
on the street next to this house?
A. I believe he did, but I couldn’t provide that because –
Dwayne’s family, like I said, they had a couple dollars,
so they could have been driving just about anything. 
6And then he had friends – I mean, personally.  He
growed up around and in my house.  I knew he sold a
lot of drugs.  So it’s possible that they could have not
only been driving a Lexus; they could have been
driving a Jaguar.
Q. But you earlier testified that his mother drove a
Maxima.
A. I seen her driving a Nissan Maxima, yes, I did.
Q. Did you tell Detective Silvers that?
A. Yes, I did, but then he asked me were there any other
vehicles.  I told them it could have been anything
because, like I said, they had a little bit of money at the
time.
Id. at A290-91.
Based on the information from the confidential informant, Silvers entered the
name “Dwayne Walker” into DELJIS to determine if anyone with that name was residing
in the Wilton area of New Castle.  This search yielded a report of a larceny having
occurred on September 6, 2003, on Appleby Road in the Wilton Park area of New Castle. 
The larceny report listed as the victim Karen Alicia Walker, an African-American woman
born November 10, 1962, and residing at 118 Dutton Court in New Castle, and as a
witness Dwayne Walker, Jr., with no middle name or date of birth but also residing at 118
Dutton Court.  In fact, the larceny report concerned the 2003 theft of plaintiff DeWayne
Walker, Jr.’s, bicycle, the report having been filed by plaintiff Karen Walker, DeWayne
Walker, Jr.’s, mother.
Silvers was not assigned to the Freeman homicide, so he gave all of this
Apparently, Dutton Drive and Dutton Court are the same street in New Castle,3
Delaware.  See App. at A204.  Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute this point.
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information to Lawson for his investigation, and Lawson followed up by placing a
telephone call to Connectiv Power Company of Delaware, whose records indicated that a
“DeWayne Walker” was billed at 118 Dutton Drive  in New Castle.  While there is a3
difference in the spellings of the first names of Dwayne A. Walker and plaintiff DeWayne
Walker, Sr., because Lawson spoke with Connectiv on the telephone, he did not pick up
on the discrepancy.  Lawson determined that 118 Dutton Drive is in New Castle,
Delaware, behind an area known as Wilton.
Lawson then put 118 Dutton Drive under surveillance for several hours.  The
undercover officers conducting the surveillance reported that a dark-colored Lexus
automobile was parked outside the house, and the license plate on the car was registered
to Karen Walker.  In addition, the surveillance revealed that a female and teenage male
were seen exiting the house, and there “was also a possibility that there was a small child
in the residence.”  Id. at A136.
On September 14, 2005, Lawson applied for a warrant to search 118 Dutton Drive
for evidence concerning the Freeman homicide.  The final three paragraphs of Lawson’s
Affidavit of Probable Cause state as follows:
8.  Your affiant can truly state that on 9-14-05, a past proven
reliable informant contacted Detective Jeff Silvers of the
Wilmington Police Drug Unit with information as to the
whereabouts of the suspect, Dwayne Walker.  The informant
stated Walker is currently hiding at his mother’s house in
Plaintiffs allege that the front door was locked, and that the police broke down the4
door in order to enter the premises, forcing it open so violently that it crashed into a table
in the foyer area.  App. at A385, A398.  Defendants contend that the front door was
unlocked, and the police simply entered the house.  Id. at A136, A185.   
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New Castle and is making plans to flee Delaware.
9.  Your affiant can truly state that according to DELJIS
records, a Dwayne Walker DOB 12-10-82 with a previous
reported incident at 118 Dutton Drive in New Castle.
10.  Your affiant can truly state current records with
Connectiv Power Company of Delaware show 118 Dutton
Drive, New Castle registered to Dwayne Walker.  A check on
DELJIS currently shows Dwayne Walker Sr. with a current
address of 118 Dutton Drive in New Castle.
Id. at A115-16.  On that day, a magistrate issued a search warrant, which authorized only
a daytime search of the residence.
A police SWAT Team and a K-9 Unit entered Plaintiffs’ home  with weapons4
drawn, rounded up all four Plaintiffs, gathered the family together in the living room, and
swept through the remainder of the house.  Plaintiffs testified that the SWAT team caused
physical damage to the home, including stained carpets and broken doors, furniture, and
railings.
Once the SWAT team confined the family in the living room, Lawson realized that
a mistake had been made, and that he was in the wrong house.  Lawson apologized and
gave his business card to DeWayne Walker, Sr., in case Plaintiffs wanted to contact the
police about any damage to the home.  The encounter lasted approximately twenty to
9thirty minutes.
II.
Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment.  In the course of
granting the motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the District Court concluded
that:  (1) “the search warrant was supported by probable cause and not procured in
violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights;” (2) “defendants’ use of force was not
unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment;” and (3) “[n]o reasonable jury could
conclude on this record that defendants purposefully discriminated against plaintiffs on
the basis of race.”  Walker v. City of Wilmington, 579 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573, 574, 577 (D.
Del. 2008).
On appeal, Plaintiffs make three principal arguments.  First, they contend that the
search warrant that authorized the raid on Plaintiffs’ home was defective because Lawson
made false assertions in, and omitted pertinent facts from, his affidavit of probable cause
submitted to the magistrate.  Plaintiffs insist that “[w]hen the false statements are
removed and the omissions added, there is no probable cause” for the search.  Appellants’
Br. at 23.  Second, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants used excessive force in executing
the warrant.  Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated the “knock and announce” rule, the
rule against unnecessary nighttime home searches, and a state law limiting the jurisdiction
of the Wilmington Police Department.  These violations are said to demonstrate the
unreasonableness of Defendants’ conduct.  Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants
violated their Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, because the
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police targeted Plaintiffs’ home for the raid because Plaintiffs are African-Americans.
III.
For reasons that will become apparent hereafter, we first address Plaintiffs’ Equal
Protection claim.  It is based upon a brief portion of the Defendants’ answer to the
amended complaint and a brief portion of Lawson’s deposition.  Defendants gave the
following responses to the following allegations of that complaint:
Complaint (App. at A352)
49.  Plaintiffs Walker, Sr., Plaintiff K. Walker, Plaintiff Walker, Jr.
and Plaintiff T. Walker have no common identification with the individual
being sought by the Defendants other than being African-American with the
household surname of Walker.
50.  The actions of Defendants traveling out of their jurisdiction
were taken because of Plaintiffs’ race.
Answer (App. at A361)
49.  Denied.  By way of further explanation, the suspect sought was
named Dwayne Walker, which is almost identical to the name of Plaintiff
DeWayne Walker.  Also by way of further explanation, the Dwayne Walker
sought was previously transported by someone named Alicia Walker, and
Plaintiff Karen Walker’s middle name is Alicia.  Also by way of further
explanation, Dwayne Walker was the same race as Plaintiff DeWayne
Walker, and Alicia Walker was the same race as Plaintiff Karen Alicia
Walker.
50.  Denied.
Lawson gave the following deposition testimony regarding this segment of the
Defendants’ answer:
THE WITNESS:  But as far as race, race has nothing to do with this. 
I mean, the only consistency is that my suspect, he was arrested for
11
homicide, was black, and Mr. Walker and his family are black.  And that’s
the only thing.  But that has nothing to do with oranges or apples.  It’s just
what it is.
BY MR. BARTOSHESKY:
Q.  Are you saying that when you did the DELJIS report on Karen
Walker, if that had shown up as a Caucasian woman, would anything have
been different in this case?
A.  Probably.
Q.  And why would that be?
A.  Because that would throw up a flag to me that maybe it’s a
different Walker from what I was being told.
App. at A232.
Plaintiffs characterize this answer and testimony as admissions by Lawson that
“race was a deciding factor in his determination that 118 Dutton should be invaded” and
that “if the records did not show that Karen was black, the invasion would not have
happened.”  Appellants’ Br. at 36.   However, this answer and testimony are more
properly characterized as showing simply that the police considered Plaintiffs’ race
insofar as it made it more probable that there was a familial relationship between
Plaintiffs and Dwayne A. Walker.  The police were searching for an African-American
suspect, so it was reasonable for them, when looking for the suspect’s mother, to seek out
an African-American woman.  No reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence or




The same answer must be given to Plaintiffs’ primary argument in support of their
Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim.  They insist that a reasonable jury could
conclude from this record that Lawson knew that Karen Walker was not Dwayne A.
Walker’s mother before he applied for the search warrant, i.e., that his case for probable
cause was a wholly fraudulent construct.  There is no direct evidence and virtually no
circumstantial evidence tending to contradict Lawson’s testimony that he did not know
this fact at that time.  In the absence of some reason why Lawson would mobilize a
SWAT team and K-9 Unit to search the home of a family whom he did not know and
whom he knew had no connection with Dwayne A. Walker, a reasonable jury could
clearly not find that Lawson had the claimed knowledge.  The only reason tendered by
Plaintiffs is that Plaintiffs are African-Americans.  However, as we previously indicated,
the record will not support a finding that racial animus was responsible for the search of
Plaintiffs’ home.
On the contrary, the evidence dictates a conclusion that the raid on 118 Dutton
Drive was the result of an unfortunate mistaken belief that Karen Walker was the mother
of Dwayne A. Walker.  Moreover, while a more careful and thorough investigation may
have avoided this mistake, given the similarity of the names involved, the misspelling of
Plaintiff DeWayne Walker, Jr.’s, name on the DELJIS report of the 2003 larceny, and the
odds against two families with such similar names living in the vicinity of Wilton, our
study of the record convinces us that the allegations of Lawson’s affidavit regarding 118
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Dutton Drive being the home of the suspect’s mother could not be found to be knowingly
false or made “in reckless disregard of the truth.”  Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 787 (3d
Cir. 2000).
However, this conclusion cannot end our analysis under Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978), because other allegations were included in Lawson’s affidavit, most
importantly that Dwayne A. Walker would indeed be at his mother’s home.  Based on the
testimony of Lawson and Silvers, a jury could find that Lawson had the same knowledge
of the information conveyed by the informant as Silvers had.  A jury could, accordingly,
further find that the informant, while reliable, (1) did not purport to have had any contact
with the suspect, (2) did not purport to know or even to have been told by anyone where
the suspect was hiding, and (3) did no more than speculate that the suspect “most likely”
went to his mother’s house because that would be characteristic behavior for him. 
Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a jury could find
that Lawson knew the informant’s information would not be sufficient to secure a search
warrant in the absence of corroboration and, accordingly, directed that surveillance of
Plaintiffs’ home be conducted.  It could further find that the surveillance produced no
evidence of the suspect’s presence there.
It is in this context that a jury could find that Lawson made his representation to
the magistrate:  “a past proven reliable informant . . . stated [that] Walker is currently
hiding at his mother’s house in New Castle and is making plans to flee Delaware.”  App.
at A115.  We conclude that this representation regarding the whereabouts of Dwayne A.
14
Walker was not only inaccurate but could be found by a jury to be knowingly false or
made in reckless disregard of the truth.
If a jury so concluded, there is no question that the misrepresentation was material
for purposes of a Franks analysis.  The informant’s “statement” was the only information
in the affidavit that provided any reason to believe the suspect was at 118 Dutton Drive. 
Moreover, while an inconclusive effort at corroboration is normally not material in a
search warrant application, where the only pertinent information is as speculative as it
was here, we believe that the results of the surveillance could be found to be material.
Thus, when we correct Lawson’s affidavit as instructed by Franks, the only
statement supporting probable cause to believe the suspect was hiding at 118 Dutton
Drive is as follows:
8.  A past proven reliable informant first informed Detective Jeff
Silvers that Dwayne A. Walker could be found at his sister-in-law’s.  When
advised that Dwayne A. Walker was not there, the informant indicated that
if he wasn’t at the sister-in-law’s house, he would most likely be found at
his mother’s because he always runs to her when he’s in trouble.  While the
informant did not know the mother’s address, he stated that she lived in
Wilton.  When my investigation provided reason to believe that a Dwayne
Walker, Sr., and Karen Walker live at 118 Dutton Drive, I caused that
residence to be surveilled for several hours and that surveillance provided
no affirmative reason to believe Dwayne A. Walker was present there.
“Probable cause exists to support the issuance of a search warrant if, based on a
totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.’”  Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).  While the reconstructed affidavit
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supports the proposition that evidence of Dwayne A. Walker’s guilt might conceivably be
found at 118 Dutton Drive, a jury could find that it falls short of demonstrating a
probability that such would be the case.  See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628,
635 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing summary judgment for defendant officer because jury could
find that he lacked probable cause).
We thus conclude that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on
the Fourth Amendment search claims on the ground that the search warrant was supported
by probable cause, and we will remand for further proceedings on those claims.  With
respect to those claims, the District Court did not reach Lawson’s qualified official
immunity defense or the issues raised by the City under Monell v. New York City Dep’t of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  Accordingly, we express no opinion with respect to
them.
V.
If a jury determines that the search warrant was invalid, there will be no occasion
to address whether the search and seizure were otherwise unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.  Plaintiffs, however, assert a number of additional, affirmative, and
independent grounds for reaching that same conclusion and providing a basis for a
remedy.
A.
“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’
under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the
16
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.”  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).  Thus, the proper application of the test of
reasonableness “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”  Id.  “[T]he question is whether the
officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation,” and this
determination must be made “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”  Id. at 396-97 (citing Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)).
In this case, the police, in addition to seeking evidence of a crime, were attempting
to arrest a murder suspect.  Murder is, of course, a very serious crime that makes it
objectively reasonable for the police to deem the suspect potentially dangerous.  Thus, it
appears that the District Court’s conclusion that having a large, armed SWAT team and a
K-9 Unit present was not unreasonable is correct.  Additionally, the SWAT team gathered
and confined Plaintiffs in the living room, and as soon as the police realized that they
were in the wrong place, they explained the situation and left the premises.  Under the
circumstances at the time, this conduct was not objectively unreasonable and provides no
independent basis for holding the search and seizure to be constitutionally unreasonable.
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B.
Justice of the Peace Courts in Delaware may issue warrants statewide.  Stroik v.
State, 671 A.2d 1335, 1338 (Del. 1996).  We agree with the District Court and with the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that, when officers have a valid search warrant
from a magistrate of the relevant jurisdiction, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
are met even if the executing officers “are acting outside their jurisdiction as defined by
state law.”  United States v. Green, 178 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 1999).
C.
“[T]he method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling [is] among the factors to be
considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure.”  Wilson v. Arkansas,
514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).  Under the “knock and announce” rule, “police officers
entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose
before attempting forcible entry.”  Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997). 
However, not “every entry must be preceded by an announcement.  The Fourth
Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a
rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.” 
Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934.
Thus, a “no-knock” entry “is justified when, ‘the police [] have a reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular
circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective
investigation of the crime.’”  Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 1997)
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(quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 394).  “Courts have upheld dispensing with the knock-
and-announce requirement in four situations:  (1) the individual inside was aware of the
officers’ identity and thus announcement would have been a useless gesture; (2)
announcement might lead to the sought individual’s escape; (3) announcement might
place the officers in physical peril; and (4) announcement might lead to the destruction of
evidence.”  Id. (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 394; Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935-37; Bodine v.
Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 397 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Stiver, 9 F.3d 298, 302 (3d
Cir. 1993); United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 978 (3d Cir. 1981)).
The District Court concluded that “although the police had conducted surveillance
of the house and had officers and dogs positioned outside . . ., the record [did] not show
that the police knew and had covered all avenues of escape from 118 Dutton Drive.” 
Walker, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 575.  Accordingly, it held that “it was reasonable for the
officers to suspect that knocking and announcing might lead to suspect Walker’s escape.” 
Id.
The District Court held in the alternative that there was no evidence (1) that
Lawson was present at the time of the entry or was otherwise responsible for the manner
in which it was effected, or (2) that the “no-knock entry was the result of the City’s policy
or failure to train.”  Walker, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 575 n.20 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).  
 We will affirm the District Court on this claim based on these alternative holdings.
Lawson testified that he was not on site when the entry was made, and there is no
evidence to the contrary.  Based on the record as a whole, a jury could not find that
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Lawson was responsible for the manner in which the SWAT team entered the Plaintiffs’
home.  Similarly, there is no record evidence from which a jury could find that the City
was responsible under Monell for the manner of entry.
D.
Lawson applied for, and was granted, only authorization to search 118 Dutton
Drive in the daytime.  This is understandable.  Section 2308 of Title 11 of the Delaware
Code, by which both Lawson and the magistrate were bound, provided as follows:
A search warrant shall not authorize the person executing it to search
any dwelling house in the nighttime unless the judge, justice of the peace or
magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary in order to prevent the escape or
removal of the person or thing to be searched for, and then the authority
shall be expressly given in the warrant.  For purposes of this section the
term “nighttime” shall mean the period of time between 10:00 p.m. and
6:00 a.m.
As a result, Lawson’s affidavit and the magistrate’s authorization do not address
whether a search conducted between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. would be reasonable and
the authorization was thus limited to a “daytime” search, i.e., a search between 6:00 a.m.
and 10:00 p.m.
We were confronted with a similar situation in United States ex rel. Boyance v.
Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1968).  We ruled as follows:
The time of a police search of an occupied family home may be a
significant factor in determining whether, in a Fourth Amendment sense,
the search is “unreasonable.”  At common law, prior to the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment, there was a strong aversion to nighttime searches. 
Even the odious “writs of assistance” which outraged colonial America
permitted search of dwellings only in the daytime.  The significance of this
aversion of the common law to nighttime searches is underscored by the
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Supreme Court’s reminder that the search and seizure clause is properly
“construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and
seizure when it was adopted.”  Carroll v. United States, 1925, 267 U.S. 132,
149, 45 S. Ct. 280, 284, 69 L. Ed. 543.
During the early years of the republic this common-law tradition was
embodied in two statutes passed by our first Congress that authorized only
daytime searches.  Thereafter, the reluctance to authorize nighttime searches
except under exceptional circumstances continued as an integral part of our
jurisprudence.
* * *
Here it is claimed that the search, though made late at night, was
reasonable because authorized by a warrant issued by a magistrate . . . 
However, the issue whether the search was in fact authorized by the warrant
is determinable by a reading of the warrant’s simple and unambiguous
language.  To find that a warrant which is explictly limited to daytime
searches legalizes search at any hour of the day or night would be to
disregard the magistrate’s actual determination and thus to nullify the
requirement of a prior impartial determination that a particular search will
be reasonable.  “When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the
right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman, or Government enforcement agent.”  Johnson v. United States,
1948, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436.
* * *
The record does not show, in possible justification for this action, any
reason for apprehension that the evidence within the house would be
removed, hidden or destroyed before morning.  Accordingly, we hold the
search constitutionally invalid.
Boyance, 398 F.2d at 897-99 (authorities, acts, statutes, and citations omitted except when 
quoting).
The District Court correctly understood the teaching of Boyance:
Unless the police had “reason for apprehension that the evidence within the
house would be removed, hidden or destroyed before morning[,]” executing
21
the daytime search warrant earlier than 6:00 a.m. would render the search
“constitutionally invalid.”  United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d
896, 899 (3d Cir. 1968).  Conversely, executing the daytime search warrant
at 6:00 a.m. or later would not.
Walker, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 576.  The District Court held, however, that the Plaintiffs were
bound by an allegation in their amended complaint that the SWAT team entered the
residence at “approximately 6:05 a.m.” and, accordingly, that the officers conducted a
“daytime” search.
The Court held Plaintiffs to be so bound based on “the sham affidavit doctrine.” 
Id.  It explained that under “the sham affidavit doctrine, ‘a party may not create a material
issue of fact to defeat summary judgment by filing an affidavit disputing his or her own
sworn testimony without demonstrating a plausible explanation for the conflict.’”  Id.  We
conclude that the District Court’s application of this well established doctrine in this case
results from a misunderstanding of the record and the rationale of the doctrine.
As we explained in Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253
(3d Cir. 2007):
[I]f it is clear that an affidavit is offered solely for the purpose of defeating
summary judgment, it is proper for the trial judge to conclude that no
reasonable jury could accord that affidavit evidentiary weight and that
summary judgment is appropriate.
The main practical reason supporting the sham affidavit doctrine is
that prior depositions are more reliable than affidavits.  The Second Circuit
noted in Perma Research that “[t]he deposition of a witness will usually be
more reliable than his affidavit, since the deponent was either cross-
examined by opposing counsel, or at least available to opposing counsel for
cross-examination.”  410 F.2d at 578 . . .  Affidavits, on the other hand, are
usually drafted by counsel, whose familiarity with summary judgment
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procedure may render an affidavit less credible.
Here, the conflict identified by the Court arose when the Plaintiffs sought to rely
upon the deposition testimonies of Karen Walker and DeWayne Walker, Jr., that were
inconsistent with an allegation in their unverified amended complaint.  As the Court
noted, the allegation was that the SWAT team burst through the door at “approximately
6:05 a.m.”  When asked about this segment of the complaint during her subsequent
deposition, Karen Walker testified:
Q.  Where were you in the house when the police came through the front
door?
A.  I was actually in the laundry room/coat closet, and I was about to put on
my daughter’s coat when they came in.  And looking at this, I see it says
approximately 6:05, but it had to be before 6:00 o’clock because I leave out
at 6:00.  And my son’s alarm clock goes off at 6:00 for him to wake up.
Q.  So the statement in there is wrong?
A.  By probably about ten minutes, the time.
Q.  Okay.  When did you realize that the statement was wrong?
A.  When I read it.
Q.  Where did the statement come from?
A.  It came from my husband.
Q.  Okay.  He was wrong?
A.  He wasn’t as accurate.  I wouldn’t say, “Wrong.”  He just wasn’t to the
minute.
App. at A385.
DeWayne Walker, Jr., testified that he was asleep in his room when he was
awakened by a “bang at the door.”  When asked when the SWAT team left, he testified:
Q.  Did they eventually leave?
A.  Yes.
Q.  About what time did they leave?
A.  I know it was before 6:00, because my alarm hadn’t gone off yet.
Q.  They left before 6:00?
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A.  Yes.
Id. at A299.  There is thus testimony from which a jury, if permitted, could conclude 
that the twenty to thirty minute episode was concluded before 6:00 a.m.
The record reveals that neither Plaintiffs’ original complaint nor their amended one
was verified by any Plaintiff.  Moreover, in context, it is clear that the deposition
testimony they sought to rely upon was not created in the face of a motion for summary
judgment.  Accordingly, we conclude that the “sham affidavit doctrine” is inapposite
here.
This does not mean that the allegation that still remains in Plaintiffs’ amended
complaint is of no consequence.  Pleadings frame the issues to be litigated in each case,
and the parties are circumscribed by the positions they take there unless and until an
amendment is effected.  Plaintiffs could have moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend
their amended complaint to conform to their deposition testimony, and they did not.  They
were not, however, confronted with a contention grounded in the rules of pleading.  If
that had been Defendants’ position in support of their motion for summary judgment, it is
reasonable to expect that a motion to amend would have been filed.
The District Court is in a better position than are we to determine whether an
amendment to conform to Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony should be permitted at this
stage of the proceedings or whether the averment in the complaint that the intrusion
occurred at 6:05 should remain a binding judicial admission.  See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v.
BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2008).  We express no view on that
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matter.  We conclude, however, that Plaintiffs, on remand, should be permitted to file
such a motion.
VI.
The District Court’s judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim, excessive force in execution of the warrant claim, and failure to “knock
and announce” claim will be affirmed.  The judgment with respect to all other claims will
be vacated, and this matter will be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
